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LEGAL CAUSE.*

II.
THE "SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR" TEST.
Professor Smith proposed, as "a general rule which, although confessedly imperfect, is nevertheless better than any
of the tests hitherto in common use," that "defendant's tort
must have been a substantial factor in producing the damage
complained of." 121 He claimed no great definiteness for this
rule; and he recognized that there is much conflict in the authorities, and that his rule would impose liability in many cases in
which they have usually refused to impose it.
Professor Smith's test allows room for the operation of
most of the considerations which seem to influence the courts
in deciding questions of legal cause; but I believe that several
of these considerations may be differentiated, and that, as applied to many situations, his test misses not only the authorities but an average sense of justice. I believe it to be erroneous, from both points of view, to suggest that nothing affects
*The first installment of this article appeared in the issue of March,
i94 of the UmvERsrtY oF PENS",VAN=.
U. oF PA. L REV. 211.)
25 HA.v. L REv. 3o9.
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legal cause except the degree in which an act is a substantial
factor in producing a result. Professor Smith recognizedt, as
an exceptiom to, this, rue, that "Where two tort-feasors are si-.
multaneoausty operating fid-pendentTy of each other, and the separate tortious act of each is sufficient in and of itself to produce
the damaging result," each is liable, although the damage would
have occurred just the same if his tort had riot been committed.12 2 On the other hand,, suppose D wounds. A, and, A
contracts scarlet fever from the person to( whom he applies for
treatment; 123 the wound, which led A to seek the treatment,
would seem to be a very substantial factor in subjecting him to
the disease, but the wound has been held not a legal cause of
the disease, and this result seems just. Again, D leaves a pit
dangerously exposed', and X intentionally thrusts A into it; DUs
act is a very substantial factor in producing the harm, but the
law does not hold him responsible, and this, dec;ion also probably agrees with, an average sense of justice.'"
JUSTICE AS THE TEST.,

The question, what is the law of causation for, is fundamental. D-has done an act; his doing it is legally culpable, and
culpable. toward P; and harm of a sort which. the law recog-.
nizes, has in-. fact- been. caused- to P by the act, in. the sense that
harm has occurred' which, but for the act, would-not have: occr-red. Why shoulf not D' be Ii'able for the whole harm? Very.
commonly he is not; very. often the law refuses to recognize himas the cause, for legal purposes, of the whole harm. As the
. law of evidence excludes from consideration much. that is evidential, the law of causation excludes; much that is consequen-.

(

tial. Is this simply arbitrary, or is there some good' reason for
it, and if so, what reason?
2 25 HARa.

L REv.

aiz

Bush v. Com., 78 Ky. 268 (88o).
'Alexander v. Town of New Castle, z5 Ind. St, 17 N. E.
Milostan v. Chicago, 148 Ill. App. 54o (igog).
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According to Professor Beale, the purpose of the doctrines
of legal cause is speed; 125 according to judge Cooley, certainty.12 6 Doubtless the requirements of speed and certainty
have some tendency in some cases to cut off some consequences
from legal view; but it is-submitted that this is a small part of
the story. The reason underlying the run of doctrines and
decisions on legal cause I believe to be simply a desire to reach
a result which is in some sense just. Courts refuse to recognize all actually-caused consequences as legally caused, not chiefly
because of doubt as to what is actually caused nor because there
are only twenty-four hours in the day, but because it would
seem unfair in many cases, and monstrous in some, to hold
people responsible for all consequences which actually result from
their wrongful acts. D sells dynamite to a small boy; the boy's
parents take it away from him, but later give it back to him,
and he explodes it and is hurt. It is clear by a preponderance
of the evidence, it is even clear beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the boy would not have been hurt if D had not sold him the dynamite; therefore, Cooley's reason for relieving defendants of liability does not apply. And the facts are simple and quickly
proved; therefore Professor Beales reason does not apply. Yet
ca or
...
. all agree,
that to
thethe
limitation
of legal
to proximate
cause
consequence
is due
impossibility
of investigation
the court making
a complete investigation and thus doing complete justice. . . . The consequences of
an act may be innumerable; to trace them would require infinite time and
patience. Here, as in all affairs of life, it is necessary to reach a result
which will secure to each interest the greatest amount of consideration which.
is compatible with an equal consideration to all other interests. To apply
this principle to the question under discussion, the court can give to the
tracing of the consequences of any particular act only its fair share of all
the available time, considering the other acts which are waiting its attention."
(33 HARv. L. REv. 636, 640.) The implication clearly is that a court would
do more "complete justice" between the parties to a given cause if it recognized all actual causation as legal; and that, in refusing to do so, courts not
only are not seeking, but are even measurably sacrificing, justice between the
parties, in order to save time and attend to other parties.
' "To the proximate cause we may usually trace consequences with some
degree of assurance; but beyond that we enter a field of conjecture, where
the uncertainty renders the attempt at exact conclusions futile." (Cooley,
Torts, [3 ed.], Vol. z. p. 99. Professor Bingham quotes and criticizes this
statement; 9 Co. L. REv. 36.) As applied to most cases, doictrines of legal
cause, so far from reducing uncertainty, greatly increase it. Whether a
given event is in fact a consequence of another, in the sense that it would
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D is not liable, because not a legal cause.127 The intervention,
after the danger which the defendant created appeared to be
over, of the boy's parents, makes it seem unjust to hold D.
The fact that the rules of legal cause are intended to produce a just result, rather than to save time or avoid uncertainty,
is emphasized by the attitude of the law toward what may be
called alternative causes; i. e., causes each of which, without
" the concurrence of the other, would have been sufficient to produce the result. In general, "a defendant's tort cannot be considered a legal cause of plaintiff's damage, if that damage would
have occurred just the same even though the defendant's tort
bad not been committed." 128 But, by exception, "where two
tort-feasors are simultaneously operating independently of each
other, and the separate tortious act of each is sufficient in and
of itself to produce the damaging result," each is liable. 129
It would be shocking to our sense of justice to relieve two
wrongdoers of liability on the ground that both -are responsible.
So, if D's wrongful act.and the innocent.act of another, or D's
wrongful act and a natural force, were, each alone, sufficient to
produce the damage, D's act is not a legal cause of the damage;.
but if D's wrongful act and the wrongful act of another were,
each alone, sufficient to produce the damage, D's act (and also
the other) is a legal cause.' 30 Yet D's act stands in the same
logical relation to the result, whether the other actor is a wrongdoer, an innocent person, or a thunderstorm. The likelihood of
the result may be the same; its directness or indirectness is the
not have occurred but for the other, is a relatively simple question; so simple,
in fact, that there is seldom any dispute over it. On the other hand, whether
one event is a legal consequence of another is often a question of much doubt
and difficulty. The very problem of legal cause is the problem when to disregard consequences which demonstrably were caused, in a logical sense, by

given acts.

'Carter
v. Towne, io3 Mass. 507 (187o); Pittsburg Reduction Co. v.
Horton, 87 Ark. 576, 113 S. W. 647 (igo8) ; Professor Beale in 33 HAv. .
Rtv. 656.
'Professor Smith, 25 HAv. L REV. 31Z
Ibid.
'Cook v. Minn. R. Co., 98 Wis. 624, 74 N. W. 561 (898);
Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 24 Idaho 561, 135 Pac. 845 (1913).
'

Miller v.
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same; the difficulties of proof, if any, are the same; and the burden -on the court's time is the same. But our sense of justice
demands the imposition of liability when the harm would not
have happened but for the wrongful action of human beings,
while it does not make the same demand when the harm would
have been produced by an innocent person, or a natural force.
if there had been no wrongful human action. And this discrimination can probably be rationalized in terms of social interest.
If the wrongful acts of D and X were each sufficient to cause
the harm, to hold each responsible for the harm, and thereby
discourage similar acts, tends directly to prevent the occurrence
of similar harm; on the other hand, if D's wrongful act and
X's innocent act, or D's wrongful act and a natural force, were
each sufficient to cause the harm, to hold D responsible and
thereby discourage acts similar to his would tend less strongly
to prevent the occurrence of similar harm, as it would have no
effect on innocent acts and natural forces.
Again, why should the wrongfulness of the action of X.
while it tends to make D liable when the acts of D and of X
are alternative causes,1 31 tend to relieve D of liability when the
concurrence of D's act and the subsequent act of X was necessary to the result? 132 For no severely logical reason; the two
legal phenomena are reconcilable, if at all, only by reference to
our free and independent sense of justice and-perhaps--to the
interests of society.1 30
mCauses each of which, without the concurrence of the other, would
have been sufficient to produce the result.
3 Cf. p. 363ff below.
"'Small faults are often the occasion of serious consequences; and if we
pursued the strict path of logic, we should hold him who in any way contributes to a loss responsible for all that follows in consequence of his
acts. But such a rule would often work great hardship. Considering, therefore, the shortcomings of human beings, the law does not charge a person
with all the possible consequences of a wrongful act, ignores remote causes,
and looks only to the proximate causes." (Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. x,
2oo Pac. 791, 793 [1921].) "The practical question for a jurist is whetlier
the tortious conduct of any human being has had such an operation in subjecting a plaintiff to damage as to make it just that the tort-feasor should
be held liable to compensate the plaintiff." . (Jeremiah Smith, 25 HARv. I..
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Usually, of course, a court's conception of justice does not
consciously involve a balancing of interests such as Dean Pound
has made familiar to his students. Frequently the sort of justice which the court aims at is simply "fairness between the parties"; but, as Dean Pound has pointed out, "questions of 'legal
cause' or 'remoteness' are often used by the courts subconsciously
to cover a balancing of other interests against the individual interest." 184 Cases may be cited which flatly contradict any attempt at summarizing the law of causation. - I suggest the following substitute for Professor Smith's substantial-factor rule
in much the same spirit in which I understand him to have suggested that rule; that is, as conforming to a larger proportion
of the actual decisions than any of the more definite tests which
have been proposed, and as indicating the direction in which the
law should move and is probably moving:
A- legal cause is a justly-attachable cause; (or) a legal consequence is a justly-attributable consequence; (or) a legal cause
is a cause which stands in such a relation to its consequence
that it is just to give legal effect to the relation: meaning by
"just," not merely fair as between the parties, but socially advantageous, as serving the most important of the competing individual and social interests involved. 18 5
REv. io4.) "Perhaps . . . no precise rule can be laid down" as to what
causes "isolate" the defendant's cause, "and the question must be put in the
general form: what in good sense and reasonableness miust be considered the
real effective cause? In other words, would it be on the whole just and
reasonable to hold the actor responsible for a consequence of his conduct
that would not have happened but for the intervention -of such a causel"
(Henry T. Terry, 28 HAav. L Ray. io, 20, 21.)
28 HARv.L. Rnv. 35o.
Confessedly this is indefinite. But it is no -more indefinite than -negligence. And it is no more indlefinite than Professor Smith's test of causation; while I submit that it is quite as close to the cases, besides having a
more direct relation to justice and a stronger tendency to promote it. _From
one point of view the proposed test is more definite than the substantialfactor test. It is equally true of both that their application to concrete cases
depends upon individual taste and feeling; but the judgment of a particular
individual that it is just to treat A's act as a cause means a fairly definite
thing-that, in that individual's judgment, it ought to be treated as a cause;
while the judgment even of a particular individual that As act is a substantial factor in producing a result means nothing definite or clear.
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Various interests may be served by finding a sufficient
causal connection between act and harm; various others, by refusing to find it. While the individual interests of one party
(in a civil case) will normally be served by finding the relation, and the individual interests of the other party'by denying
it, the question in which direction the social interest lies is seldom clear and usually complicated. The social interest in the
general security is frequently, but not always, best served by
finding the relation; the social interest in the individual human
life will sometimes be best served by finding it and sometimes by
denying it; the social interest in the advancement of knowledge,
and general progress, while it will frequently have no bearing
on the case, will sometimes count in one direction and sometimes in the other. The considerations to be weighed are indefinite in number and value, and the balance that is struck is

130
necessarily rough. It is sometimes urged that justice between the parties to a

civil case is always on the side of holding the defendant-who
by hypothesis has done a wrong-responsible for all the actual
consequences of his wrong, since the alternative is to leave the
innocent plaintiff to bear some of them.13 7
' Since this article was written, Professor Bohlen has shown me an
tmpublished paper of his in which he has suggested an analogous explanation of legal cause. Speaking of the law of torts, he says: ". . . -the
wrong must not only be a causa sine qua non or necessary antecedent of the
harm, but in order that the wrong may be the legally proximate cause of the
violation of the right, the causal connection must be so close that the person
guilty of the wrong should be regarded as responsible for the violation of the
right, which in fact results from it. The principles, if any, which determine
how close a causal connection must be to render the wrongdoer liable for
the violation of a right, which in fact results therefrom, are confused and
conflicting. They appear to be a compromise between two conflicting ideas of
the function of tort actions, the one that it is to punish the wrongdoer, the
other that it is to do distributive justice by shifting the loss already caused
by the defendant's wrong from the plaintiff to the defendant . . . Even
the same court may at different times lean to the one point of view or to
the other, and to this extent its decisions must necessarily be conflicting.
As a general rule, however, such principles-if one may dignify them by
such a name-as are applied are a more or less instinctive compromise, between the logical implications of the two points of view."
u' Cf. Jeremiah Smith, 25 HARv. L. REv. 24
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This argument has force; but it is not unanswerable. One
answer is that as a matter of fact our ideas of justice do not,
in a multitude of concrete cases, require or permit the holding
of the wrongdoer for all the consequences- which actually follow
from his wrong. Suppose D negligently (or even, as in People
v. Elder, 1 38 intentionally) knocks A down, and, before A can
get up, X seizes the opportunity to kill him by a kick in the face.
Probably few of us would think it just to hold D for the death.
Or D by negligent driving runs down and injures A, who thereupon postpones a trip on which he was setting out and returns
home for treatment; A's son next day contracts scarlet fever,
which is communicated to A and leads to his death. 39 In each
of these cases it is clear that D's act was an actual cause of the
death; that is, but for D's act the death would not have occurred;
but in neither case was it a legal cause. Do not current ideas
of fairness agree with the law in refusing to hold the defendant?
In many of the cases in which actual causation is present but
legal causation absent, the question of justice is more -doubtful
and would be answered differently by different individuals, but
it is probable that in the great majority of such cases a large
proportion of people would think the result just.
Nor is it impossible to rationalize this feeling that it is not
always just to hold a man responsible for all the actual consequences of his wrongful acts. We all have to take chances,
including the chance of being injured by the acts of others. If
we are injured by an act which is not negligent or otherwise
wrongful, we have to bear the loss, even though the action which
injured us was taken for the defendant's own pleasure and under
no sort of necessity, and even though it created-as most action
creates-some risk of harm. The social interest in the individual human life, and particularly in the freedom of individual
action, seems to be served by this arrangement. The gains to

m

100
IMich. 515, 59 N. NV. 237 (1894).

Cf. Bush v. CoM., 78 Ky. 268 (i8go). On the actual facts of the
Bush case, the propriety of relieving D of liability is perhaps less obvious.
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the defendant and to society which result from the defendant's
immunity seem to outweigh the loss to the plaintiff. But suppose it is found that the act which injured us was wrongful. It
now seems best to impose upon the actor the burden of some of
the consequences of his act; but it does not follow that it is best
to impose upon him the burden of all the consequences which
may fortuitously occur. One consideration to the contrary is
the possibility of error. It is artificial to ignore the fact that the
defendant may not h ave acted, or acted wrongfully; the plaintiff may not have suffered harm; or the plaintiff's harm may
not be in any way traceable to the defendant's wrong ;-although
all these issues have been found in favor of the plaintiff. But
even assuming .perfect certainty in regard to those matters (and
the certainty, in many cases, is very great), still it does not follow that it is best to impose upon the wrongdoer the burden of
all the consequences of his act. Considering the social interest
in the freedom of individual action, along with the other social
interests involved, it may well be best to strike some sort of
compromise, in which the actor is charged with some of the
more normal and direct consequences, and the burden of the
more abnormal and indirect ones is left where it falls; and that,
in a general way, is what the law does. Suppose the defendant's
wrong is a negligent wrong. !f the yictim of an act which is
in no degree negligent, but also in no degree necessary, should
bear the whole of the loss which happens to fall upon him, what
is to -show that -the victim .of an act which is in some degree
negligent should bear none of the loss? If the circumstances
under which two aicts are done differ so slightly that one act
is barely negligent while fth other barely misses being negligent,
would it seem reasonable to charge the doer of the. one with Ioo
per cent. of the consequences, however remote or remarkable,
while the doer of the other is charged with none of the consequences, however immediate and normal? Can so slight a change
in the premise support so vast a difference in the conclusion?
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Why should the circumstance that an act falls on one side or
the other of the line which the law has more or less arbitrarily
fixed in respect to wrongfulness, make in all cases all the difference between a ioo per cent. liability for consequences and an
entire absence of liability for consequences? If there are other
considerations besides the wrongfulness of the act which affect
our answer to the question, for what consequences is it just to
hold the defendant, should they not also affect the answer to
the question, for what consequences is he legally liable? I submit that there are many such considerations; such as the defendant's intent, the nature of his wrong, the number, character and likelihood of the forces which intervened between his
act and the harm complained of, the extent to which- time and
space intervened, and, above all, the likelihood of the harm.
Even from the point of view of the individuals concerned,
leaving society out of account, the system of legal cause as it
exists may in some measure be justified as a sort of mutual
insurance. The advantage to the plaintiff of a stiffer rule would
not be unmixed. The-average plaintiff is but little less likely to
commit wrongs-negligent wrongs at least-than the average
defendant; or to see it made to appear that a wrong, which he
did or did not in fact commit, caused harm which was not in
fact suffered. The plaintiff today may be the defendant tomorrow. It is not only better for the defendant. and for society
that his responsibility should stop somewhere; it will occasionally
be as well for the plaintiff to forego recovery for a part of the
harm which he has suffered today and escape an unlimited and
ruinous liability tomorrow, as to be made whole today and
ruined tomorrow.
FORESEEABILITY OR "PROBABILITY" OF RESULT.

Except only the defendant's intention to produce a given
result, no other consideration so affects our feeling that it is or
is not just to hold him for the result as its foreseeability; and
.no other consideration so largely influences the courts. It ig
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common to say that legal consequences are "natural and probable" consequences; that a wrongdoer is a legal cause of "those
consequences that ought to have been foreseen by a reasonably
prudent man," 140 and of no others. This is only measurably
true. It has been pointed out above that, in cases of every sort,
some kind and degree of foreseeability is sometimes required;
whether the result was produced by defendant with a good deal
of directness 141 or through an intervening force caused by defendant's force 12 or through a force which intervened after
defendant's force had "come to rest." 143 It has been .pointed
out that the general idea of foreseeability or risk may be analyzed into more particular ideas (what degree of risk, what sort
of risk, risk apparent to whom and at what time); that courts
sometimes require a very precise sort of foreseeability and a
high degree of risk 144 .but are sometimes satisfied with a very
general sort of foreseeability and a slight degree of risk; 145 So
that the only moderately definite proposition on the subject which
approximates universal validity is a narrow one substantially
to the effect that if, from D's own point of view at the time
he acted, his act produced such a risk as. should deter a reasonable person, that the very chain of events which actually supervened would cause the very loss which occurred, D has legally
caused the loss. 140 But in the great majority of cases it seems
just to treat D as a cause, and the law does so accordingly, if
from the point of view of a reasonable man with D's information 147 his act produced a substantial risk 148 that a result of,
11

s29

Cardozo, J., in Perry v. Rochester Lime Co.,
(xx6).
P.22o above.

219

N. Y. 6o, 113 N. E.

P. 226ff above.
P. 23iff above.
'"P. 233 above.
"P. 237 above.
'"P. 232 above.
" "As much as observation . . . would: disclose to a well-informed
man, plus any knowledge which the wrongdoer himself had." (Professor
Bingham, 9 COL. L REv. 141.)
"Probable" in this connection, according to Jeremiah Smith, does not
mean more likely than not, but "rather 'not unlikely'; or, more definitely,
24
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the same general character as that which was actually produced,
would be produced; 149 but this is not always sufficient 1"0 and,
as Professor Bohlen, Professor Smith and Professor Beale have
shown, it is not always necessary.1 5 1 Other considerations tending to show the justice or injustice of treating the defendant's
act as a cause may turn the scale; but the influence upon the
court of the likelihood or unlikelihood of the result is almost
always very great. The greater and the more specific the risk,
the stronger is the tendency to find legal cause.
The foreseeability of a consequence has, particularly in the
case of negligent wrongs, much to do with one's feeling about
the justice of holding the defendant. If a layman is confronted
with a case in which D's act produced peculiar consequences,
he is likely to say that D should not be held, and to offer as
his reason the fact that D could not be expected to anticipate
such consequences. And the relation between this feeling and
the social interest is fairly clear. If conduct of a given sort is

unlikely to cause harm, it follows that, though it has caused
'such a chance of harm as would induce a prudent man not to rum the risle;
such a chance of harmful result that a prudent man would foresee an appreciable risk that some harm would happen." 2S HARv. L. REv. ix6. These
alternative formulations are by no means identical in meaning. There may
be such a, chance of harmful result that a prudent man would foresee an
appreciable risk that some harm would happen, and yet the circumstances in
which the defendant is placed may be such that a prudent man would rtm,the
rioc.
111"In, order that a consequence should be probable it -is not necessary.
that the precise consequence that actually happens in all its details should,
have been probable, nor that- it should be connected with its cause by the
precise chain of causation that was probable, It need only be of such a
general character as might reasonably have been foreseen." Henry T. Terry,
28 HARv. L, REv. 18.
". . . the harm- which was foxeseeable and the speci6c harm which
actually resulted need not be absolutely identical. Undoubtedly they, must
both relate to the same persons or class of persons, and to the same subject
matter, i. e., to an infringement of the same right in the plaintiff; but these
requirements are consistent with wide variations as to the mode of bringing
about the harm, and the precise nature and extent of the harm." Jeremiah
Smith, 25 HARv; L. REv. 238.
'" P. 233 above.
M4o An. L. RmE. (N. S.) 79; 25 HAR'v. L. REv. 123ff, 223ff; 33 HARV.
L. REv. 644, 646. Cf..p. 237 above.
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harm on a particular occasion, society has no interest in discouraging similar conduct, and the only social intercst which, can
ordinarily weigh against the defendant is the interest of the cornmunity in restoring the individual plaintiff to his previous condition; while if conduct not only has caused harm but is of a sort
which is likely to cause it, it follows that to hold the defendant,
whether civilly or criminally, will tend to pronote the general
security, and frequently other social interests as well, y discouraging similar conduct of the defendant or others in the
future. If the wrongfulness of .the defendant's act consists
in its negligence, some harm must have been more or less likely
to result from it; yet if the harm which has resulted is different
from that which was likely to result, there is no close relation
between the seriousness of the harm and the seriousness of the
social interest in discouraging the conduct, and to make the
defendant bear the whole burden of the harm is likely to overprotect that social interest and under-protect others, particularly
15 2
the social interest in the freedom of individual action.
Yet other circumstances may make it just, in a particular
case, to treat a defendant as the legal cause of an unforeseeable result, or as not the cause of a foreseeable one. That harm
was foreseeable as possible, or even likely, is not conclusive even
with respect .to negligence; it is sometimes reasonable to take
a chance. Why should it be conclusive with respect to causa-

I:Cf. the considerations suggested above, p. 349, in support of the
proposition that defendants ought not to be held for all consequences of their
acts.
It has been said that to limit a defendant's liability to reasonably foreseeable consequences "is to say that I may contemplate doing an injury to my
neighbor, may contemplate the extent to which he may suffer by the wrong
which I am about to commit, and that, if I use ordinary prudence and
judgment in the calculation, the innocent sufferer must bear the risk of error
-a doctrine as callousin its morality as it is absurd in its logic." (A. A.
Boggs, Proximate Cause in the Law of Torts, 44 Am. I-. R.v 88, 97.) But
in the ordinary negligent wrong, one does not "contemplate doing an injury"
at all; the negligenice frequently consists in, or results from, the very failure
to contemplate it; and if the defendant intends the injury, foreseeability is
immaterial (p. 357 below), while, if his act is criminal or consciously wrongful, the importance of foresceability is much reduced.
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tion? If the defendant has acted wrongfully, and created a risk,
which ought to have deterred him, that the very harm which
was in fact caused would be caused, it will practically always
seem just to hold him for the harm; but if he created only a
moderate (though a substantial) risk that some slight harm of
the same broad general character as that which was in fact
caused, would be caused, and the harm that was caused was
very peculiar, or remarkably extensive, or both, it will not by
any means always seem just to hold him. The cases which refuse to treat the presence of some risk as conclusive against the
defendant in respect to causation, are therefore quite defensi58
ble.1
CRIMINAL,

iNrENTIONALLY WRONGFUL, AND

RECKLESS AcTs.

From the point of view of the social interest, it would seem
that the law should attach responsibility for more remote and
unlikely consequences when defendant's act is criminal, or consciously wrongful, than when it is merely negligent; since it is
specially advantageous to society to discourage such acts. And
there is abundant evidence of such a tendency in the law. The
tendency is noticed, for example, by Jeremiah Smith, who disapproves of it (disapproves, that is, of any greater leniency in
cases of negligent wrongs than of others).1 54 The same tend1 53
ency is noticed by Street.
I Cf. p. 233 above.
"In particular cases it seems not unjust that defendant should not be
responsible for specific consequences to which a certain wrong of a third
person has contributed, even though that 'rong and its particular effects
were 'probable' results of defendant's wrong." Professor Bingham, 9 CoL.
L REv. x43.
"' "Courts frequently hold a wrongdoer liable for an improbable consequence in cases where defendant's conduct was not only tortious but
'illegal' in the sense of being criminal, especially if the crime were of some
. . Courts frequently hold a wrongdoer liable for imlrobable
magnitude..
consequences in cases where his act was intentional and was consciously
wrong; even though the act was not criminal, and though the specific result
which followed was not intended." Courts "do not always so hold, nor are
jurists unanimously agreed as to whether they should so hold. But the
tendency seems to be in favor of such holding." (25 HARV. L REv. 230, 231,
232.)

3". . . . as the wrongful act which is alleged to have caused the damage increases in moral obliquity or in illegality, the legal eye reaches fur-

LEGAL CAUSE

357

It would seem to follow also that -the law should attach
responsibility for more remote and unlikely consequences when
defendant's negligent act misses due care by a wide margin than
when it misses it by a narrow margin. Except in connection
with certain statutes which directly require the consideration of
degrees of negligence, it has become good practice to repudiate
the idea that there are such degrees; and doubtless the wrongfulness of an act does not often depend upon any distinction between slight, ordinary, and gross negligence. It remains true,
as a matter of simple fact, that it is possible for one's conduct
to fall short of reasonable care by a wide margin or by a narrow margin. As it has sometimes been expressed, there may
be in a given case forty precautions, all of which a reasonable
person would take: the defendant may neglect one of them, or
lie may neglect them all. Though he has acted negligently in
either case, it remains possible for the law to recognize the difference between the two cases by taking a longer view of legal
cause in the second case than in the first. Though there seems
to be little tendency in the cases to recognize expressly the propriety of this distinction, it is submitted that there is a real tendency to act upon it. If it is negligent under given circumstances
to drive an automobile faster than twenty miles an hour, is it not
safe to say that a court will tend in a doubtful case (and causation cases are frequently doubtful) to hold a man who has
driven at sixty miles for consequences which it would not charge
to one who has driven at twenty-one miles? This tendency is
evidenced by the cases in which the defendant's recklessness is
emphasized incidentally to a decision that his act is a legal cause
of the damage.
ther and will declare damage to be proximate which in other connections
would be considered remote. . . . That in wanton trespass or in assault
and battery, for instance, legal causation reaches further than in a wrong
of mere inadvertence or negligence cannot be questioned." (Foundations of
Legal Liability, Vol. T, p. iii.)
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DEFENDANT'S INTENTION.

If the defendant intended to produce the very result which
be succeeded in producing, it is clear and familiar that he is a
legal cause of the result, however remote and remarkable the result may be; for the reason, evidently, that this seems just. "Any
intended consequence of an act is proximate. It would plainly
be absurd that a person should be allowed to act with an intention to produce a certain consequence, and then when that very
consequence in fact follows his act, to escape liability for it on
the plea that it was not proximate." 151
It is extremely rare to find a suggestion to the contrary. Such
a suggestion is made, however, as to one case, by Sir James Stephen in his Digest of the Criminal Law. In Article 219, "Killing defined," is this statement: "A tells B facts about C in the
hope that the knowledge of these facts will induce B to murder
C, and in order that C may be murdered; but A does not advise
B to murder C; B murders C accordingly. A has not caused C's
death within the meaning of this article." It is submitted that
it is more orderly to treat the question raised by these facts as
being whether A's act is. wrongful, or whether it is privileged,
not whether it is a legal cause of the result. Perhaps A has a
privilege of telling the truth, available when he is prosecuted for
murder as well as when he is sued for libel. It seems unfortunote to admit an exception to what is probably the only specific
rule regarding legal cause which is fairly capable of being treated
as free from exception.
Has an intention not to produce a given result a bearing on
the question whether an act did, in a legal sense, produce it?
Courts have sometimes been influenced by this negative intention
ii deciding questions of legal cause favorably to the defendant.
In the leading case of Commonuealth v. Campbell,257 in which
it was decided that a rioter was not responsible for the death
I Henry T. Terry, 28 HARv. L. REv. xi; cf. Jeremiah Smith in 2S HxAv.
M
L REV. 22
%T7All. s~x (Mass. 1863), cf. note 73 above.
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of a person killed by a soldier in resisting the rioters, the court

said: "Certainly that cannot be said to be an act of a party in
any just sense, or any sound legal principle, which . . . is com-

mitted by a person who is his direct and immediate adversary,
and who is, at the moment when the alleged criminal act is done,
actually engaged in opposing and resisting him. . .

."

While no

good reason appears for attaching such great weight to this sort
of consideration, and it seems better to support Commonwealtlt v.
Ca pbell, if at all, on other grounds, the consideration may fairly
be given some weight in a doubtful case.
The bearing upon the social interest of the defendant's intention seems plain. Acefs which are intended to cause harm tend.
to produce it; the social interest in discouraging them is therefore evident. Conversely, acts which are intended not to producei
harm have less tendency to produce it than merely indifferent
acts.
DEFENDANT'S MOTIVa.

The defendant's motive in acting as he did (as distinguished
from his intention to produce the damage in question) is not
commonly treated as having any bearing on legal cause; but it
may in some cases have a bearing on what is felt to be the justice of holding the defendant for a particular consequence, and
it is accordingly inevitable that courts should sometimes be influ-.
enced by this consideration. The suggestion is made by Professor Bingham 158 in discussing Guille v. Swan 159 in relation to
Scholes v. Railway Co.1 60 In the Guille case, defendant went up
in a balloon, and was held responsible for the damage done by a
crowd which rushed upon plaintiff's land when defendant unintentionally came down there; in the Scholes case, a railway engine fell from defendant's line into plaintiff's garden, because of
defendant's negligence, and defendant was held not responsible

Ig

Cot. L. REv. 3r, note.
% ig Johns. 381 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. z82z).
in21 L. T. R. (N. S.) 835 (Misi Prius, i87o).
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for the damage done by the crowd (except as to efforts to get the
engine out). "The view of the judge in the Scholes case is not
necessarily inconsistent with the decision in Guille v. Swan. The
difference in the occupations which led up to the respective torts
is an important consideration. The trespasses involved in Scholes
v. Co. were caused by negligence of defendant's servants in prosecution of its important public calling.

.

.

. The defendant in

Guille v. Swan Was engaged in what the Court no doubt considered a foolhardy venture tending only to gratify the curious and
idle. . . ." 181 A court would not be human if it were never
influenced to take a long or a short view of a problem of causation by its opinion of the necessity, propriety, or advantage of
the defendant's general activity incidentally to which the wrong
was done.
The bearing of this sort of consideration on the social interest is obvious.
LOGICAL DIRECTNESS: INTERVENING FORCES.

It has been pointed out above that the criterion of logical directness is indefinite 102 and frequently inconclusive; that an indirect consequence is very often a legal consequence 163 and a
direct consequence is sometimes not a legal consequence. 1 "4 Yet
it hardly needs demonstration that the greater or less directness
with which harm follows from an act-in other words, the number and conspicuousness of the contributing forces that intervene
between the act and the harm-strongly affects our sense of justice and so the law. It is true that the word "proximate" is much
used in a merely conventional sense, but it is not always so used;
and every case and every discussion in which it is said, otherwise than in a merely conventional sense, that a man is respon3'19 Cot. L Rnv. 31, note.
in P. 214.
in P. 216. Yet, as has also been pointed out above (p. 236), courts occasionally hold that the mere intervention of the act of a third party between
D's act and P's injury relieves D of liability.
a"P. 220.
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sible for the "proximate" consequences of his acts, and not for
the "remote" consequences, testifies to (though it overstates) the
importance of directness.
And tjhere is a real relation between directness and the social
interest. The more directly-whether logically, or in time and
space-harm follows from an act, the greater (other things being
the same) is the tendency of such acts to cause such harm, since
the occurrence of the harm is the less likely to have depended in
the particular case upon unusual combinations of intervening circumstances; and the greater, accordingly, is the interest of society
in discouraging like acts, in order to prevent the recurrence of
like harm. Qn the other hand, the more remote the consequence,
the more the social interest in security is served-as by a statute
of limitations-if the law refuses to go back to the cause and
make it responsible. Also, the possibility of going wrong on the
question whether there was actual causation tends to be least
when the apparent causal relation is closest. Finally, the interest
of the plaintiff in getting compensation from the defendant tends
to be strongest when the causation is most direct, as there is then
the least likelihood of there being some other wrongdoer against
whom the plaintiff can recover.
On the other hand, logical directness is no more conclusive
as a matter of justice than it is as a matter of law. D ejects
P from a house in zero weather; P lies where D drops him, and
is frozen; but warmth and shelter are abundant and obvious in
the neighborhood. Professor Beale in an article published some
years ago 165 declines to hold D as a legal cause of P's exposure
after he might.have got shelter. This seems just, and is probably
law. 168 Yet a clearer case of direct causation could hardly be
1
imagined; D put P into a cold place and P froze there. T
"Recovery for Consequences of an Act, 9 H^nv. L. Rzv. 8o, 8s.
I Cf. Hendrickson v. Com., 85 Ky. 28T, 3 S. W. 166 (1887); State v.
Preslar, 48 N. C. 42r 0856).
I It may be suggested that a sounder analysis of such cases isto the
effect that legal cause is present. but the defendant escapes because the
plaintiff is guilty of something like contributory negligence; but this can
scarcely explain criminal cases like those just cited.
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Perhaps some cases in which the victim might easily have
avoided the harm are almost the only ones in which it would
seem clearly unjust to hold the defendant for results which follow
with the highest conceivable degree of directness from his wrongful act; but in some cases in which the degree of directness is
comparatively high, it seems more just to relieve the defendant,
although there was no opportunity for the victim to save himself. Suppose D, a chauffeur, drives his car over a small flat
box. This is negligent toward A, a passenger, in that it is likely
to give him a slight jolt. But the box contains a high explosive,
which explode and kills A. Would it be reasonable or just to
hold D responsible for the death? 168
It is submitted that an average sense of fairness hardly tolerates holding a defendani for consequences of the first seriousness which are utterly astonishing, even though they are produced pretty directly. And no argument is necessary to show
that it would not be just to relieve defendants in all cases from
responsibility for consequences which are indirect. If a consequence is intended, for example, or is extremely likely though
not intended, few would question that it should ordinarily be
treated as legally caused, however indirectly it is brought about.
Other attributes of intervening forces, besides their number and conspicuousness, bear upon legal cause. While it is not
usually held to be indispensable to legal cause that the particular
1 68
means by which the result is brought about be foreseeable, 4
the greater or less foreseeability of the means frequently influences the decision. The foreseeability of the result, and the other
circumstances, remaining the same, the readiness of courts to hold
defendants for ultimate results varies with the foreseeability of
the intervening action."'
' A court might or might not hold him. Cf. Bigwood v. Boston &
Northern St. Ry., 209 Mass. 345, 95 N. E. 751 (git).
" Cf. note 149 above. "
'*Several of the cases stated above, p. 233, illustrate this.
Innocent and foreseeable intervening action "does not necessarily break
the causal connection." If the intervening action is wrongful, "It gradually
came to be admitted that the earlier tort-feasor is liable in cases where the
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This tendency also probably corresponds to our ideas of justice. If a moderately foreseeable result is produced by an altogether unforeseeable means, it may or may not be just to hold the
defendant for the result, but it is less likely to seem just than, if
the means also are foreseeable. D -negligently knocks down A in
the street. It is more or less likely that the team of X will run
over A before he can get up. A is not, in fact, run over, but is
struck and injured, as he is getting up, by a quantity of snow
and ice discharged' upon him from the roof of a nearb house.
The result is the risked result-personal injuries to A,; but- the
means is not the risked means. Is it not much less clear that D
ought to be held for the injuries than it would be if they had
been produced by A's being run over? 170o
The foreseeability of the means by which the harm is produced has much the same bearing on the social interest as the
foreseeability of the harm itself. The advantage to society- of
discouraging, conduct like- the defendant's depends, not on the
harm which it' happens to produce on a particular occasion, but
on the harm which it is likely to produce. If the means are unforeseeable, the harm itself, though it be of the same general sortas the harm that was risked, is likely to differ greatly from- it
in degree; in which case there is little relation between the extent
of the harm whichthe plaintiff has suffered and the extent of the
social interest in discouraging the act which the defendant has,
done; and that interest may be over-protected (relative to other
interests involved) if the burden of the plaintiff's harm is imposed on the defendant.
commission of the subsequent unlawful or tortious act and the happening
of the damage ought to have been foreseen by him as not unlikely to follow "
Jeremiah Smith, 25 HARv. LREX.Ix8, 121.
"The decided though perhaps not unanimous tendency of modem authority is to make the liability of the original actor depend . . . upon
this-whether or not, in view of the surrounding circumstances, and the
conditions which the defendant's conduct may be expected to create, the third
party's subsequent action was normal, and so, expectable:' Professor Bohlen, 2r HARv. L. REv. 235, note.
"'Probably few courts would hold D for the injuries in the case first
put, though most would hold him in the other case.
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It has been said by some writers that if the defendant's
act caused (or, "actively" caused) the intervening action, his act
is always a legal cause of what results from the intervening action. This statement is criticized above, in and it is pointed out that
there is a strong tendency on the part of the courts to. require
that the intervening action be lawful, and also that the intervening action and its effects be in some sort foreseeable, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant's act "actively caused" the
ititervening action. Yet the extent to which the intervening forces
were caused by the defendant's act is one of the considerations
which count. For example, the courts tend to insist less upon
finding foreseeability in the intervening force and in the ultimate
harm, when the intervening force is brought into operation by
the defendant's act than wien his act merely enables it to take
effect to the plaintiff's damage. This tendency also probably
corresponds to prevailing ideas of justice. The defendant's act
is likely to seem to have more to do with the ultimate resultto be, in Professor Smith's phrase, a more "substantial factor" in
producing it-in the one case than in the other. Probably chance
has, on the average, less to do with producing the result, and it
is therefore more important to discourage conduct like the defendant's, in the one case than in the other.
Again, the intentional wrongfulness, and still more the criminality, which, as characteristics of the defendant's act, tend to
lengthen the reach of legal cause,' 2 as characteristics of the intervening action tend to shorten itr 1a These two tendencies are
consistent. The greater and more striking the impropriety of an
act, the more just it seems to attach to it responsibility for con'P.

223ff.

355 above.
m Cf. Horan v. Watertown, 217 Mass. 185, io4 N. E. 464 (1914) and
Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 219 N. Y. 6o, x3 N. E. 529 (Iiq6), discussed
"P.

above, p. 233.

This tendency has been criticized; "liability, even in the case of a foreseeable result, was not established withQut an attempt at an illogical limitation; namely, that liability attached only where the later tort was negligent,
and not where it was wilful:' Jeremiah Smith, 25 HAv.L REy. 121. Ci.
Professor Beale, 33 HARv. L. Ray.'657.
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sequences, and the less significant appear the other causes which
contributed, as a matter of fact, to the result.
A municipality maintains an excavation dangerously near
to the traveled part of a street or sidewalk. If X negligently
forces P into the excavation, the city is responsible; 174 but if X
produces the same result intentionally, the city is not responsible. " '
Courts have- sometimes gone to great lengths in relieving
the original actor of liability where the intervening action was
criminal or intentionally wrongful, notwithstanding the very considerable likelihood of the intervening action.
X threatened D with a bomb. D, in order to shield
himself; moved P to a position between X and D. X threw
the bomb, and P was injured. Held, intcr alia, that D's
act was not a legal cause of the injury, as the independent
act of X intervened after D's act 1 78
D, a sheriff, had X in custody under an indictment
charging X with assault with a deadly weapon upon P. D
negligently let X escape, and X made a further assault upon
P. Held, inter alia, that D's act was not a legal cause of
the second assault 77
The "Lusitania" sailed into waters known to be infested with German submarines, after the German government had announced its intention of sinking her if she did
so. Held, the action of the vessel was not a legal cause of
the loss of life that resulted when she was sunk, because the
independent illegal act of the submarine intervened2 78
To allow such weight to the mere circumstance that the intervening action was criminal seems unreasonable. It is also unusual. Sometimes little or no weight is given to the criminality
of the intervening act
T

Carterville v. Cook, 129 IIl. x2, 22 N. E. .14 (1889).
'Alexander v. Town of New Castle, xi$ Ind. 51, 17 N. E. 2o0 (I888);
Milostan v. Chicago, z48 Ill App. 54o (i9o9).
'.Laidlaw v. Sage, z58 N. Y. 73 (1899).
'"Hullinger v. Worrell, 83 Ill. 22o (1876).
"The "Lusitania," 251 Fed. z75 (1918).

366

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

D sold liquor knowing that the buyer intended to resell
in violation of law. Held, D was guilty of aiding and abetting in the resale.17a
D negligently collided with P's agent, making him unconscious and spilling the goods from his wagon. A bystander stole the goods. Held (5 judges dissenting) the
accident was a legal cause of the theft, because the theft
was foreseeable as likely and occurred promptly.18 0
In Fottler v. Moseley 181 in which D fraudulently induced P not to dispose of certain corporate stock, the subsequent embezzlement by a corporate officer, for the consequences of which D was held responsible, was not even
particularly likely.
The modem tendency is clearly away from any fixed rule
relieving the original actor of liability in every case in which the
intervening action was criminal. Professor Bohlen has said:
"The decided, though perhaps not unanimous, tendency
of modem authority is to make the liability of the original
actor depend not upon the negligence or even intentional
wrongfulness of the subsequent act of a third party,... but
rather upon this,--whether or not, in view of the surrounding circumstances, and the conditions which the defendant's
conduct may be expected to create, the third party's subsequent action was normal, and so, expectable." 182
It does not follow, however, that the tendency to attach
somewhat greater weight to the intervention of intentionally
wrongful than to the intervention of merely negligent action will
disappear. It will probably remain, because it probably agrees
with prevailing ideas of justice. Here, too, something (though
perhaps not much) can be done *inthe way of rationalizing our
sense of justice in terms of the social interest. The interest of
the injured person in being compensated, and of society in seeing
' Cook v. Stockwell, I13 L. T. R. 246 (K. B.. i95).
'Brower v. N. Y. C. & H. R. L Co., 9i N. J. L 19o, io3 At. 166
(,gi8).
L x85 Mass. 563, 70 N. E. io4o (19o4) ; stated above p. 239.
Us 2 1 HARV. L REV. 236,

note.
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him compensated, can frequently be well protected without hold-ing the original wrongdoer, if criminal or intentionally wrongful action of a third person intervened. The interest of society
in discouraging criminal or intentionally wrongful conduct is
likely to be best served by denying a recovery against the original -wrongdoer (who may have been merely negligent), since a
judgment against him reduces the likelihood that the intervening
wrongdoer can and will be made to answer. And, while the intervention of criminat or intentionally wrongful conduct is sometimes foreseeable, usually it is not, so that the character of the
intervening act bears more or less on the likelihood both of the
intervening act itself and of the ultimate harm.
I submit that, as Henry T. Terry suggested was perhaps the
case, " . . .no precise rule can be laid down" as to what are
"isolating" causes, "and the question must be put in the general
form . . .would it be on the whole just and reasonable to hold
the actor responsible for a consequence of his.conduct that would:
not have happened but for the intervention of such a cause?" 183
DIRECTNESS IN TImE AND SPACE.

A hard and fast test of legal cause based on directness or
remoteness in time or space is neither sense nor law. As Professor Beale points out, if A sends poisoned candy across the
continent, or strikes a blow which causes death long after, the
intervention of the miles or of the months does not necessarily
relieve him of responsibility.1 8 4
The New York Court of Appeals, in a series of cases beginning with the Ryan case,'6 5 has applied sharp geographic limits
to liability for the spread of fire; but these cases appear to stand
practically alone.
m 28 HARv.L REV.21.
'33 I-AHv. L REv. 642. Cf., however, the old rule that "A person is
pot deemed to have committed homicide, although his conduct may have
caused death. . . . When the death takes place more than a year and a
day after the injury causing it." Sir James Stephen, Digest-of Criminal Law,
Art. M 2r.
Ryan v. N. Y. C. R. P-, 35 N. Y. 210 (x86).
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From the fact that nearness or remoteness in time or space
is not normally or as a matter of law conclusive of the presence
or absence of the relation of legal cause, it does not follow that
such nearness or remoteness is never conclusive; it may well be
conclusive occasionally and as a matter of fact. As Professor
Smith said, "No doubt these elements are often important to be
considered in determining the question of fact as to the existence of such relation." so Similarly, Judge Cardozo, speaking
for the New York Court of Appeals, has said that it is "inpossible . . . to set aside as immaterial the element of proximity
in space. The law solves these problems pragmatically. There
is no use in arguing that distance ought not to count, if life and
experience tell us that it does." 7*
Cases which, like that just cited, emphasize the effect of
intervening space upon legal cause are comparatively rare, but
'w25 HAtv. L Rsv. xo6.
I Bird v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 24 N. Y. 47, i2o N. E. 86 (i9t8).

The court held that the spatial remoteness of an insured boat froni an explosion due to fire, put outside the contemplation of the parties to the fire insurance policy an injury to the boat arising from the concussion which the explosion produced. As in any contract case, the question before the court
was not whether the damage was legally caused by the fire, but "how far
the parties to this contract intcnded us to go"; not whether the causal connection was such as the law contemplated, but whether it was such as the
parties contemplated. But the opinion declares that "alike in contract and in
tort, contiguity or remoteness in space may determine either the existence
or the measure of liability." This is far from saying that distance ig
always, or usually, or even often, conclusive.
Professor Beale vigorously takes issue with Judge Cardozo; on the
ground, if I understand him, that nearness and remoteness in time or space
do not count at all, and can never determine the presence or absence of the
relation of legal cause. (33 HARV. L REv. 642.) 'But in the application of the
general rules which Professor Beale proposes, nearness and remoteness in
time and space must often count heavily, by determining whether defendant's force came to rest "in a dangerous position" (p. 65o), making defendant liable, or "in a position of apparent safety" (p. 651), making defendant immune. Compare the following quotation from an earlier article of
Professor Beale's: "Where A gave to B (an innocent party) poison to be
administered to C, and B put the poison on a shelf in C's sick-room, where
D found it and gave it to C, A is properly chargeable with the administration of it to C. But if B had thrown it on a dust-heap, where E a year
afterward had found it and innocently administered it to C, the force of

A's act would have been spent before E found the poison, and A would
not have been chargeable with the.administration to C." (9 HARv. L Rv.
8S.)
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cases which emphasize the effect of intervening time are not uncommon; and the principle involved is the same.
D negligently started a fire, which spread to P's premises. In holding D liable, the court said, by way of distinguishing the New York case of Hoffman v. King, 8 8 that
in that case "the fire had burned two days, and passed over
more than two miles of country, before reaching the plaintiff's land. We do not mention these facts, however, as
determinative; for, in the true logical view, neither time
nor distance nor both are conclusive of the remoteness of
the damnages, but are proper elements to be looked to, in the
particular circumstances of each case, in arriving at a conclusi6n as to whether the damages are . . . the proximate

or remote consequence of the defendant's act." 119
D negligently started a fire, which spread to P's premises. In holding D liable, the court said: "It is contended
by the plaintiff in error that the damages are too remote .
It is shown by the testimony that a strong wind
,was blowing at the time the fire was set, that it spread
-rapidly from the place where started until it reached the
property destroyed, that it was a continuous burning; the
destruction of the property in controversy was therefore
the direct and natural result of the escape of fire from the
engine." 190

D, a contractor, erected a heavy cornice at the top of a
building so badly that its fastenings rotted and rusted.
The owner of the building negligently failed to inspect and
Temove the cornice; and it fell upon A and killed him. Held,
inter alia, D's negligence was not a legal cause of the death,
because the negligence of the owner of the building, and the
passage of some considerable time, intervened between D's
act and the accident. "We do not think that counsel for
the plaintiff would claim that . . . .tin roofs and nails rust

out and wood work rots overnight. It takes a considerable
period of time, probably some years, for such rusting and
rotting as to render these materials useless or insufficient for
building purposes." '91
i i6o N. Y.68,s N. EF 4o (189).
'Ala. & Vicksburg Ry. Co. v. Barrett, 78 Miss.
'Burlington
'Howard

432, 28

So. 820 (1900).

& Mo. R. R. v. Westover, 4 Neb. 268 (1876).
v. Redden, 93 Conn. 6o4, io' At. 509 (i919).
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D collided with P's agent, making him unconscious and
spilling the goods from P's wagon. A bystander promptly
stole the goods. Held, the accident was a legal cause of the
theft, because it was likely that the goods would be stolen.
"Again, strictly speaking, the act of the thieves did not
intervene between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's loss;
the two causes were to all practical intent simultaneous and
concurrent; it is rather a case of a joint tort than an intervening cause." 192
D negligently inflicted personal injuries on A, which
led to his insanity and ultimately to his suicide. Held, the
original injury was not a legal cause of the suicide. "The
argument is not sound which seeks to trace this immediate
cause of the death through the previous stages of mental
aberration, physical suffering, and eight months' disease and
medical treatment to the original accident on the railroad." 9at
D railroad negligently shunted cars between P's cattle
and their keepers, which "infuriated" the cattle. In holding
D liable for the destruction of scine of the cattle, which
were found dead or dying some hours later on another part
of the line, Lord Cairns said: "Everything that occurred- or
was done . . . must be taken to have occurred or been done
continuously: the cattle rushed on in a state of fury, passed
along the occupation road, charged the fence of the garden,
and so got on to the railway, and were ultimately killed." 194
Is not Judge Cardozo right when he says that "life and experience tell us" that distance counts? Do not the time and space
'"Brower v. N. Y. C. R. R., 91 N. J. L.

190, 1o3

AtI. 166 (1918).

The time
l.Scheffer v. Washington, etc., Ry., io5 U. S. 249 (i88S).
element is usually overlooked in discussions of this case; but in Salsedo
v. Palmer, '278Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 2d, i92), Mayer, Circ. J., dissenting, says

of the Scheffer case: "The conclusion is based upon the proposition that
the court construed the suicide as being too remote in point of fact and of
time from the original accident, and also as not a result naturally and rea-

sonably to be expected from an injury which was caused not by deliberate
acts, but by a negligent act."
'" Sneesby -. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., L RL i Q. B. D. 42 (Ct. Ap.,

x875).

Cf. the opinion of Quain, J., on this case in the Queen's Bench:

"In tort the defendant is liable for all the consequences of his .illegal act

where they are not so remote as to have no direct connection with the act,
as by the lapse of time, for instance."

Pollock, Torts (i

ed.), p. 35.

L R. 9 Q. B. 2

(1874) ; quoted by
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between act and consequence affect our judgment of the propriety of imposing liability? With the passage of time, the
apparent risk usually diminishes. If P's goods are stolen immediately after D exposes them, the risk of theft appears to have
been considerable and the propriety of holding D responsible
seems fairly clear; but if the goods lie about for a week and
then are stolen, the risk of theft appears to have been slighter,
and the propriety of holding D more doubtful. With the passage of time, an act is likely to become so buried under later events
that it strikes us as having nothing substantial to do with the
ultimate injury; it ceases to be, in Professor Smith's phrase, a
"substantial factor." What is true of time is sometimes equally
true of space. "A tort very remote in time or space may have
practically spent its force and may not have been potentially operative at the time of the harm; or its effect may have been
infinitesimal." 193
The reluctance of the law, and of our sense of justice, to
impose liability when much time has elapsed between the act and
the consequence, is illustrated by the old rule of criminal law
that "A person is not deemed to have committed homicide, although his conduct may have caused death . . . When the death
takes place more than a year and a day after the injury causing
it." 111 Statutes of limitations are familiar expressions of the
same broad tendency; a long lapse of time between D's act and
its consequence, like a long lapse between either and P's suit,
' Professor Smith, 25 H~Av. L REv. lo9, n1o.
"Can a consignee recover against a negligently delaying carrier for damage happening to goods a year after their delivery, upon the allegation
that, but for the detention, the goods would have been sold and would! not
have been exposed to a cyclone twelve months later? Probably-not. In
,general, a jury could not reasonably find that the effect of the delay appreciably continued so long and that the delay was a substantial factor in subjecting plaintiff to the loss. In cases not so .extreme, the evidence may
qometimes justify the submission of the question of fact to a jury; but no
mathematical line can be drawn. The nearer the happening of the damage
comes to the time of the defendant's delay, the more apt will the jury be to
find a causative relation under our test. They are still more likely to End
causative relation when the loss occurs during the delay and while the
iRcods are still in the defendant's custody; but we do not regard either of
these elements as legally essential to liability." (Ibid., p. 323.)
IN Stephen, Digest of Criminal Law, Art. 2.
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tends to persuade us that the best thing for the law to do with
the situation is to let it alorne. The social interest in the general
security is likely to weigh in, the defendant's favor.
Finally, this same tendency is closely analogous to, and. frequently indistinguishable from, the tendency to attach importance to "logical" directness of causation. Results which strike
us as relatively direct logically, are usually (though not always)
relatively direct in time and space. There is little reason, from
the point of view of the authorities or of justice, for giving conclusive effect to the one sort of directness and no effect at all to
the other. Both are significant; neither is conclusive.
LEGAL CAUSE AND THE JURY.

It would be impossible to formulate all the considerations
that may, on occasion, affect a reasonable man's response to the
question whether a given act should be treated as the cause of a
given event. Except in one or two rather narrow classes of cases,
no generalizations about legal cause can be relied upon to give a
just result; and except in such cases, no generalizations can be
relied upon to give a legal result. With the question of causation
as with other questions of fact, good sense requires that large
latitude be left to the judgment and intuition of the trier of the
fact; the limit of this latitude is the point beyond which the judgment and intuition of the court tell it that a reasonable man
would not go.1 0 7 To bind the trier to find the fact, in each case, -in
the way that experience may have approved in more or less comparable cases, is much like binding him alwayg to prefer, as between witnesses, the disinterested to the interested, the educated
to the ignorant, the well to the sick. The proposed rules would
frequently contradict each other, and, even if they all pointed in
one direction, other considerations equally reasonable, and in'I

do not mean to suggest that courts always look at the matter in

this way. On the contrary, courts frequently refuse to permit findings on
causation which are entirely reasonable, because they do not agree with
the finding or because the finding conflicts with some arbitrary rule.
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tuition as well, might point clearly in the opposite direction aid
be clearly entitled to respect.
What is to be said to a jury?
It is submitted that substantially the following propositions
(as far as the evidence makes them pertinent) might properly
and usefully be embodied in instructions to a jury:
i. A legal cause is a justly-attachable cause. A legal consequence of an act is an event which is justly attributable to the
act.
2. Except when the separate act of eithei of two wrongdoers would have been sufficient, without the other, to produce
the event, an event is not a legal consequence of an act if it would
have happened without the happening of the act.
3. If the actor intended the event, and the event would not
have happened without the happening of the act, the event is a
legal consequence of the act.
4. But an event which was not intended is frequently not a
legal consequence of an act, although it would not have happened without the happening of the act.
5. "Just" means, not merely fair as between the parties, but
socially advantageous, as serving, directly and indirectly, the
most important of the competing individual and social interests
involved. In deciding whether it is just to attribute an unintended harmful event to a particular act without which the harm
would not have happened, you may consider any circumstances
which you think pertinent, but you should not neglect the following considerations:
(a) The character of the act. If the act was a crime, or
intentionally wrongful, this tends to make it just to treat it as
a cause of the harm. If the act was negligent, a marked failure
to use reasonable care tends more strongly than a slight failure
to make it just to treat the act as a cause of the harm. If the act
was negligent, the necessity, propriety or public advantige of the
course of conduct incidentally to which the act was done, may
be considered as having some tendency to make it unjust to treat
the act as a cause of the harm.

374

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA -LAW REVIEW

(b) The risk of the harm. If -on the basis of the information which A had, or reasonably ought to have had, when he
acted, his act produced such a risk as should have deterred a
reasonable.- person,-, that: events- closely similar to those which
supervened would cause- harm clbsely similar- to that which occurred, the act is a legal cause of the harm. The presence of
this kind-and degree of foreseeability is conclusive, regardless
of other considerations. If on the basis- of the informationwhich A had, or reasonably ought to have had, his-.act produced a substantial risk that harm of the same general character
as that which occurred, would occur, this tends strongly tomake
it just to attribute the harm to the act; but if other- considerations point strongly in the opposite direction, you may find that
the act did not cause the harm although foreseeability of this
kind and degree was present. If the act producecl no substantial risk of- harm of the same general character as that which
occurred, this tends- strongly- to-,makee- it-unjustto treat-he:-act
as a cause of the harm: but if other considerations point strongly
in the opposite direction, you may find that the act did cause the
harm. A greater risk tends more strongly than a less-riski and
a more specific. risk more strongly than. a- more general one, to
make it just to treat the act as the cause- of-the harm.
If between the act and- the- harm there- wa&an intervaLduring which the risk.created by the act, had apparently ceased (or
substantially ceased) to. exist, this, tends strongly to make it
unjust to attribute the harm to the act.
(c) Logical directness- and intervening forces.. The more
directly the -act appears to have -produced the harm-that is, the
fewer and the less striking-the contributing forces. which intervened between act-and harm-the more-just it'is-to attribute-the,
harm to the act. As-between an intervening event which would,
and one which would not, have occurred- without the happening,
of the act, the first tends more strongly than the second to make
it unjust to attribute the harm to the act. Criminal or consciously
wrongful intervention has a greater tendency than negligent intervention, and negligent intervention has a slightly greater tendency
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than innocent or irresponsible intervention, to make it unjust to
attribute the harm to the act. But neither the presence nor. the
absence of intervention in any form or amount is conclusive: it
is often just to attribute harm to an act although there was much
intervention, and it is sometimes unjust to attribute harm to an.
act although there was very little intervention. Intervention
which was, in specie or in its general nature, foreseeable as not
unlikely, has far less tendency to make it unjust to attribufe the
harm to the act than intervention which was not foreseeable;
and the greater and the more specific the risk of the intervention, the less the tendency to make it unjust to attribute the
harm to the act.
(d) Directness in time and space. The less the time and
space which intervened between act and harm, the more just it
is to treat the act as a cause of the harm.
Henry T.
George Washington University
Law School.

Edgerton.

